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I. INTRODUCTION
Antonio Sanchez was employed as a waiter for a local chain of restaurants
in Washington State. He has effeminate traits that were often pointed out to
him by his co-workers.' Throughout his employment, Sanchez was continually
harassed by fellow workers who mocked him and told him that he carried his
serving tray "like a woman."2 They referred to him as "she" and "her" and
taunted him with derogatory names that implied he was gay or womanly.3
Sanchez complained to his general manager and an assistant manager, but no
action was taken until he finally reported the treatment to the company's human
resources director.4 After four or five "spot checks," whereby the director
spoke only once to Sanchez and never to any of the offending employees,
Sanchez walked out on his job.5 He then filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging he was a victim of harassment
"because of sex" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.6 Sanchez
alleged sexual stereotyping, claiming he was harassed because he did not act
how others perceived a man should act.7
Meanwhile, in Las Vegas, Nevada, Medina Rene was on a team of all-
male butlers who worked on the twenty-ninth floor of one of the largest casinos
in the valley.8 Unlike Sanchez, Rene is an openly gay man, a fact known to his
* J.D. Candidate for 2004, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas; B.A. and B.S., University of California, Davis (1997). I would like to thank
Professor Ann C. McGinley for her contributions to early thoughts on this topic.
1 See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
I Id. at 871.
6 Id. at 874; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) (making it unlawful to discriminate
"against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin..
7 Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874.
8 See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'g en banc, 305
F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1573 (March 24, 2003).
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co-workers. For two years, Rene's co-workers harassed him daily.9 They
made crude and demeaning remarks, calling him "sweetheart" and "doll,"
whistling at him and giving him sexually-oriented "joke gifts.' ' 0 His com-
plaints to superiors were to no avail." Like Sanchez, Rene filed a complaint,
alleging he had been sexually harassed in violation of Title VII.'2 Rene stated
in his complaint that he was harassed because he is gay.' 3
The circumstances underlying the claims of these two victims are strik-
ingly similar, the difference being that Sanchez's harassers presume he is gay,
while Rene's harassers know he is gay. Both men suffered name-calling and
sexual comments, although Rene suffered them on a daily basis and also
received sexually explicit gifts. In the Ninth Circuit, Sanchez has a valid sex-
ual harassment claim based on sexual stereotyping. Rene, however, has no
cause of action because his harassment allegation is based on the fact that he is
gay. The Ninth Circuit has held, absent some further evidence such as physical
touching of a sexual nature, sexual orientation discrimination is not cognizable
under Title VII.
This note will examine the treatment of "same-sex" harassment victims
like Sanchez and Rene in the American court system. Part II looks at the his-
tory of sexual harassment and illustrates the progression of harassment
"because of sex" to include sex stereotyping and same-sex harassment. In
doing so, this note focuses on the Supreme Court decisions that make such
claims actionable. Part III examines the shift in understanding of the term
"because of sex" as it has moved from a strict biological interpretation to a
broader gender-based definition of "sex." Part IV compares the plight of
Antonio Sanchez and Medina Rene in an effort to make sense of why the Ninth
Circuit, absent some type of physical harassment of a sexual nature, would find
relief for one harassment victim but not the other. This comparison illustrates
the difficulty in distinguishing between sexual stereotyping and sexual orienta-
tion discrimination within the context of same-sex harassment. It also reveals
why sexual orientation discrimination should be recognized as a form of imper-
missible sex stereotype harassment. Finally, Part V of this note shows the
growing trend toward recognizing sexual orientation as a protected category of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, noting that protection for victims of this type
of discrimination is not only warranted, but is inevitable.
II. THE PROGRESSION OF HARASSMENT "BECAUSE OF SEX" TO INCLUDE SEX
STEREOTYPING AND SAME-SEx HARASSMENT
The text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act explicitly states that "it shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to . . . discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
9 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc decision).
10 Id.
" Rene, 243 F.3d at 1207 (panel opinion).
12 Rene, 305 F.3d at 1064 (en banc decision).
13 Id.
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sex or national origin ... ." However, the statute gives no guidance as to
what "because of sex" actually means.
Congressional debates and legislative history are not helpful in interpret-
ing the meaning of "sex" in the statute because the term "sex" was proposed
and added to the prohibitions of Title VII with little discussion or thought.
"Sex" was not included in the list of protected categories until supporters of the
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") began a campaign to include the cate-
gory. 15 ERA supporters urged Congressman Howard Smith, a conservative
Virginian and long-time supporter of the ERA, to make a motion to add "sex"
to the Civil Rights Act. 6 Though Smith supported equal rights for women, he
had opposed the Civil Rights Act for being an impermissible regulation of pri-
vate business. 7 Congressman Smith's motion to add "sex" to the Act, a cate-
gory he thought sufficiently different from that of race or religion, was actually
an attempt to thwart passage of the entire Act. 8 As the language of the statute
reflects, this attempt backfired; "sex" was added to the bill, and the concept of
what constitutes discrimination "because of sex" has evolved ever since.1 9
A. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: The Development of Sexual
Harassment as a Cognizable Claim Under Title VII
One major step in the evolution of discrimination "because of sex" was the
recognition of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. In Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, because the
term "sex" was added to Title VII at the last minute and with scant discussion
in Congress, courts have been left with little guidance in interpreting the Act's
prohibition of sex discrimination.2' To aid its interpretation, the Court looked
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation Because of Sex.2 ' In defining actionable Title VII sexual harassment,
the Guidelines outline workplace conduct that may be prohibited.22 Examples
of such conduct include "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." 23 The Guide-
lines provide that such misconduct "constitutes prohibited 'sexual harassment,'
whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid
pro quo, where 'such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hos-
tile, or offensive working environment.' 24  Thus, the Meritor Court
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
1' Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggrega-
tion of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1995) [hereinafter Central Mistake].
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 65.
22 Id. (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1985)).
23 Id.
24 Id.
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recognized not only economic harm to sexual harassment victims, but also
harm to their dignity that results from the unwelcome conduct.
In addition to the EEOC's interpretation of discrimination because of
"sex," the Meritor Court looked to the plain language of Title VII, noting an
absence of language limiting discrimination to that which is "economic" or
"tangible." 25 The statutory language includes the phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment," inferring a congressional intent to "strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women."'26 Based on these
considerations, the Court held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title
VII by showing discrimination based on sex that leads to a "hostile work envi-
ronment. ''2' According to this theory, workplace conduct is actionable when it
is unwelcome and affects a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment.28
This conduct must be both objectively and subjectively severe or pervasive,
actually altering the conditions of employment.29 Mere horseplay or stray
offensive utterances are generally insufficient for an actionable claim.3 °
Even though Vinson's involvement in a sexual relationship with her super-
visor was "voluntary," the Court rejected the argument that her claim should
fail on that basis. 3' The Court would not provide a defense under Title VII just
because Vinson was not forced to participate in sexual conduct with her boss
against her will. 32 Rather, the material component of a sexual harassment com-
plaint is that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome. 33 Thus, the
appropriate question is not whether the victim of sexual harassment voluntarily
participates in the sexual activity, but whether the victim indicates by words or
conduct that the advances are unwelcome. 34 This approach by the Meritor
Court validated the lower courts' treatment of sexual harassment claims based
on EEOC Guidelines and precedent from racial harassment claims. However,
this approach did not end the inquiry regarding exactly what discrimination
"because of sex" means.
B. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Recognition of "Sexual Stereotyping" as
a Form of Sexual Harassment
Three years after deciding Meritor, the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to test the limits of what constitutes discrimination "because of sex." In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Ann Hopkins brought a suit against her employer for
25 Id. at 64.
26 Id. (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
27 Id. at 66.
28 Id. at 67.
29 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993) (setting out objective and
subjective standards for determining whether conduct is severe enough to create a hostile
work environment). In order to meet the subjective standard of severity, the victim must
actually perceive the environment as hostile. In order to satisfy the objective standard of
severity under Meritor, the environment must also be objectively hostile or abusive to a
"reasonable person." Id. at 21-22.
30 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
31 Id. at 68.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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failure to promote her to partner, alleging she had been discriminated against
on the basis of sex. 35 Hopkins had been employed with Price Waterhouse for
five years, and had just secured a major contract with the Department of State
worth twenty-five million dollars, when the partners in her office proposed her
as a candidate for partnership.36 The trial court found Hopkins' negotiations
secured more major contracts than any other partnership candidate proposed in
that year.37 The trial court also found that Hopkins was the only woman out of
eighty-eight candidates considered for partnership. 38 Many partners in Hop-
kins' office gave positive evaluations of her work performance, noting she was
"'an outstanding professional' who had a 'deft touch,' a 'strong character,
independence and integrity.' ,,3 Based on these evaluations, as well as positive
client comments, the trial court found that Hopkins was "generally viewed as a
highly competent project leader who worked long hours, pushed vigorously to
meet deadlines and demanded much from the multidisciplinary staffs with
which she worked."
40
However, this drive to succeed often came across as too pushy. In fact,
she had been counseled by partners to improve her relations with staff mem-
bers, many of whom found her "brusque" and "unduly harsh."'" At trial, Hop-
kins testified that despite her success in securing major contracts for the
partnership, she was criticized by certain partners for her aggressive behavior.
She was called "macho" and was told that she "overcompensated for being a
woman."4 2 Her use of profanity was also criticized, not merely for its content,
but "because it's a lady using foul language. 4 3 Most advantageous for Hop-
kins' case was the advice given by a partner that her chances for partnership
would improve if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jew-
elry."' In short, the same aggressive behavior that made her a successful pro-
ducer for the company was seen as inappropriate behavior for a female partner.
This dynamic created an impossible "catch 22." 45
In analyzing the language of Title VII with respect to Hopkins' case, the
Supreme Court found that the prohibition of discrimination "because of sex"
meant that "gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. 4 6 In the con-
text of sex stereotyping, the Court held that "an employer who acts on the basis
of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has
acted on the basis of gender."'47 In Hopkins' case, aggressiveness is an essen-
tial requirement of her job, creating a double bind: if she behaves too aggres-
15 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
36 Id. at 233,
37 Id. at 233-34.
38 Id. at 233.
39 Id. at 234.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 234-35.
42 Id. at 235,
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 251.
46 Id. at 240.
47 Id. at 250.
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sively she will be fired, while the same would be true if she does not act
aggressively enough.48 The Court found that Title VII was designed to lift
women out of this bind and "strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. 49 However, to have an
actionable claim based on sex stereotyping, the plaintiff must show that the
employer did, in fact, rely on gender when making its adverse employment
decision.5 ° Stereotypical remarks will always be evidence that gender was a
motivating factor, but they may not always be enough.5'
Though the gay and lesbian community viewed the Court's opinion in
Price Waterhouse as a positive step towards prohibiting sexual oriet tation dis-
crimination, lower courts remained hesitant to question gender roles and con-
tinued to find that "hostile work environment" sexual harassment was not
cognizable in a unisex workplace.5 2 It was nearly a decade before the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of "same-sex" harassment.
C. Oncale v. Sundowner: Same-Sex Harassment Prohibited Under Title VII
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether men have an
actionable claim under Title VII for sexual stereotyping. However, the Court's
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services indicates that males should
be equally protected under this theory.53 Joseph Oncale worked as a roustabout
on an oil platform with an all-male crew. During his employment, he was
forcibly subjected to humiliating sex-related acts by his co-workers and was
threatened with rape.5 4 These acts included multiple physical assaults of a sex-
ual nature.5 5 When complaints to supervisory personnel failed to end the har-
assment and produced no disciplinary action, Oncale quit his job and filed a
complaint alleging he was discriminated against in his employment "because of
sex. 56 The trial court held that Oncale had no cause of action as a male
against male co-workers. 57 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding nothing in
the statutory language suggesting that same-sex harassment claims were
excluded from the scope of Title VII.5
8
The Oncale Court listed examples of what might constitute same-sex har-
assment. For instance, same-sex harassment "because of sex" may be proven
by credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.59 However, harassing
conduct "need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex." 6 ' A cause of action may also exist if a
female victim can sufficiently prove that she was harassed in such "sex-specific
48 Id. at 251.
41 Id. (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See Central Mistake, supra note 15, at 96.
11 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
54 Id. at 77.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 79.
59 Id. at 80.
60 Id.
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and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is
motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.'
Likewise, a plaintiff may offer comparative evidence to show how the harasser
treats members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace, a situation commonly
referred to as the "equal opportunity harasser."
62
Acknowledging lower court arguments that male-on-male sexual harass-
ment was not the "principal evil" Congress intended to protect when enacting
Title VII, the Oncale Court stated: "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils."'63 The Court reasoned
that citizens are ultimately governed by the provisions of our laws, rather than
the principal concerns of our legislators. 64 Thus, same-sex harassment may be
recognized when conduct is so objectively offensive that it alters employment
conditions. The Court also emphasized that objective severity should be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the victim's position while con-
sidering the surrounding circumstances. 65 This includes paying close attention
to the social context in which the victim experiences the unwelcome behavior
of his or her aggressor. 6
The examples set forth in Oncale, though helpful, have resulted in confu-
sion among lower courts. Some courts read the list as exhaustive, limiting rem-
edies accordingly. 67 Other courts equate same-sex harassment as a form of
sexual orientation discrimination and dismiss the case for not stating a cogniza-
ble claim under Title VII.6 8 However, the Oncale Court never suggested these
were the only possible ways to bring a same-sex harassment claim. In fact, the
Court stated: "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or
she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with
offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'discrimination . . .
because of ... sex.' ,69 The language - "whatever evidentiary route" - indi-
cates that a plaintiff may choose any path to prove the requisite discrimination
and is not bound by the examples set forth in Oncale. Nonetheless, several
courts continue to read such limitations into the language of Oncale.7° At this
61 Id. This is often called the "queen bee syndrome." See Edward S. Adams, Using Evalu-
ations to Break Down the Male Corporate Hierarchy: A Full Circle Approach, 73 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 117, 170-71 (2002) (describing "queen bee" syndrome, but noting that existence of a
"queen bee" is "most likely over-reported and largely anecdotal").
62 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81. See also Kyle F. Mothershead, How the "Equal Opportu-
nity" Sexual Harasser Discriminates on the Basis of Gender Under Title VII, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1205 (2002).
63 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 81.
66 Id.
67 See Matthew Fedor, Can Price Waterhouse and Gender Stereotyping Save the Day for
Same-Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Under Title VII? A Careful Reading of Oncale Compels
an Affirmative Answer, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 455, 468-75 (2002).
68 Id.
69 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
70 Davis v. Coastal Int'l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that
"plaintiffs in same-sex harassment suits can survive summary judgment by making a plausi-
ble showing according to one of the three Oncale methods"); King v. Super Serv., Inc., 2003
WL 21500008 (6th Cir. June 26, 2003) (relying on the three examples given in Oncale);
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time, only the Ninth Circuit recognizes a claim for same-sex sexual stereotype
harassment.7 ' However, as discussed below, even the Ninth Circuit has exper-
ienced difficulty drawing the line between sexual stereotyping and sexual ori-
entation discrimination. This difficulty will continue to exist until sexual
orientation discrimination is recognized as a form of prohibited sexual
stereotyping.
III. WHAT IS THE MEANING OF "BECAUSE OF SEX"?: THE MOVEMENT FROM
A BIOLOGICAL OR ANATOMICAL VIEW OF SEX TO A GENDER-BASED
DEFINITION OF SEX
Part of the difficulty in separating sexual orientation discrimination from
sexual stereotyping lies in the fact that definitions of sex and gender have con-
tinually evolved throughout the history of sexual discrimination jurisprudence.
In an article lamenting the "disaggregation of sex from gender," Katherine
Franke tracks the definitions of "sex" and "gender," noting how the Supreme
Court's perception has changed over time.72 These perceptions have been
clouded by the Court's oversight or refusal to clearly state what it means by the
"characteristic that is sex."73 This problem is compounded by the absence of
Title VII legislative history interpreting discrimination "because of sex."74
This lack of direction has led many lower courts to read Title VII as a
prohibition of discrimination based on biological sex - that an individual's bio-
logical or anatomical sex should be irrelevant in employment decisions.75
Under this theory, one can only be discriminated against "because of sex" when
the individual is treated differently because of his or her status as a man or a
woman, which is the "biological fact" of the individual's sexual identity.76
Basing employment decisions on an individual's biological sex, which defines
the individual from the moment of birth and stems from "unalterable, biological
traits," is just as unfair as arbitrary discrimination against an individual because
of his race.77 In both instances, the individual has no power to change his or
her circumstances, and membership in the disfavored category generally has
little to do with an individual's ability to perform the functions of a job.
Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc., 729 N.E.2d 726 (Ohio 2000); but cf. Bibby v.
Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that, based on
the Supreme Court's opinion in Price Waterhouse, "a plaintiff may be able to prove that
same-sex harassment was discrimination because of sex by presenting evidence that the har-
asser's conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not conform to the stereotypes
of his or her gender."); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., Inc., 187 F.3d 862, 865 n.4 (8th Cir.
1999) (noting that limiting relief to the three scenarios presented in Oncale was a misguided
reading of the case because "[w]hile Oncale does recite these three methods of proving
sexual harassment, it refers to them as examples of 'evidentiary routes' a plaintiff might
'choose [ ] to follow' in establishing his case.").
71 See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
72 See generally Central Mistake, supra note 15.
73 Id. at 13.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
71 Central Mistake, supra note 15, at 31.
76 Id. at 31-32.
77 Id. at 32.
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The theory that "because of sex" means "because of biological or anatomi-
cal sex" was seriously challenged when courts began facing claims of sex dis-
crimination by "transgendered" individuals. 8 Courts struggled with how to
define rights for individuals who had previously been a member of the opposite
sex. For example, when faced with a man and a transgendered woman seeking
a marriage license, an Ohio court declared: "it is generally accepted that a per-
son's sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination by the birth
attendant."79 Thus, once a baby is identified as either a boy or girl, this
becomes the person's "true sex" for eternity, 80 no matter what external changes
an individual may go through.
However, current gender theory has moved away from the concept that
"sex" refers only to the anatomical and biological distinctions separating men
and women, recognizing that the term "sex" also encompasses gender and the
characteristics seen as appropriate in an individual's sex. 8' This shift was
embodied in the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse that "gender
must be irrelevant to employment decisions."82 It is clear from that opinion
that those in charge of making employment decisions may not refuse employ-
ment or promotion to an individual for failing to comply with gender norms
associated with his or her biological sex. What is not as clear in the aftermath
of Price Waterhouse, and even Oncale, is just how same-sex sexual stereotyp-
ing and sexual orientation discrimination can be distinguished. The result has
been a backlash in this area of sexual harassment law, causing courts to regress
to the limiting biological definition of "sex," which offers little relief to a vic-
tim when the harasser is the same sex.
Kathryn Abrams addressed the problem of same-sex sexual harassment by
comparing sexual harassment to racial harassment. 83 Abrams noted that Title
VII's inclusion of discrimination because of "color" and "national origin" ena-
bled courts to uphold cases brought by plaintiffs against alleged harassers that
appeared to be in the same protected "race" as the plaintiff (such as a light
skinned black person bringing a claim against a darker skinned black person).84
It has not been nearly as easy for individuals filing claims against others within
the same protected category of "sex" (such as the effeminate man bringing a
cause of action against his more masculine harasser).85 Courts dealing with
early cases of same-sex harassment found causes of action only where the
alleged harasser was homosexual.86 In essence, this followed the theory that
"because of sex" meant biological or anatomical sex, whereby a plaintiff could
prevail only by showing that he would not have been harassed "but for his
78 Id. at 33-51.
71 Id. at 52 (quoting In Re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. 1987)).
80 Id. at 52-53.
81 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995).
82 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
83 Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. Rav. 2479,
2510-17 (1994).
84 Id. at 2503-09.
85 Id. at 2510-17.
86 Id. at 2511.
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sex." 87 Because of judicial reliance on the biological theory of sex, Title VII
did not protect male plaintiffs who did not fit neatly into their gender category
or were uncomfortable with sexual conduct or discussions in the workplace.88
Ideally, courts should recognize that like race, there are many "shades" in
the gender spectrum, and harassers are often motivated by animosity towards
an individual who rests somewhere in between the feminine or masculine
extremes. Instead, courts seem reluctant to veer from the traditional under-
standings of "sex." Since legitimate sexual harassment claims by these plain-
tiffs cannot pass the "but for" test,89 such claims continually fail, even after the
Supreme Court's decisions in Price Waterhouse and Oncale.
One reason lower courts may be uneasy about extending the stereotype
theory of sexual harassment to same-sex harassment claims is that throughout
its opinion in Oncale, the Court did not once cite Price Waterhouse.9" This
makes it questionable whether the Court intended to address sex stereotyping
among members of the same sex. However, Price Waterhouse also dealt with
an adverse employment action (the denial of a partnership) by Hopkins' super-
visors. This is vastly different from co-worker harassment. This may be a "can
of worms" the Supreme Court did not mean to open in regard to sexual stereo-
type discrimination since it is often hard to distinguish between normal work-
place banter between co-workers and actionable harassment.
Furthermore, while the Oncale Court recognized that same-sex harass-
ment may be actionable, it did not decide whether Oncale was subjected to a
hostile work environment. Instead, the Court remanded the case for the lower
court to decide. 9 ' Even though the Court stressed that nothing in Title VII
infers that same-sex harassment claims be excluded, 92 it appears that many
courts are unwilling to recognize most of these claims. Thus, while the Oncale
opinion opened the door to the possibility that claims of same-sex stereotype
harassment may be actionable, it has not given lower courts, with the exception
of the Ninth Circuit, the confidence to proceed under this theory.
IV. A COMPARISON OF Two CASES IN THE NINTH CIRcurr
Thus far, only the Ninth Circuit has braved the waters that lie between
same-sex harassment and sexual stereotyping, but it has not done so without its
share of confusion. An examination of two cases will show how difficult it has
been for the Ninth Circuit to draw the line, both factually and morally, between
sex stereotyping and sexual orientation discrimination in same-sex harassment
cases. This examination illustrates the need to treat both claims equally.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2512.
89 Id. at 2511-12. Using the "but for" test, a plaintiff would have to show that he or she
would not have been discriminated against "but for" his or her sex.
90 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
91 Id. at 82.
92 Id. at 79.
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A. Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.: Discrimination "Because
of Sexual Stereotyping"
Antonio Sanchez was employed with Azteca Restaurants for nearly four
years.93 During his tenure with Azteca, Sanchez endured ongoing verbal abuse
by several male co-workers and a supervisor, who based their comments on his
effeminate characteristics.9 4 Specifically, Sanchez testified that male co-work-
ers mocked him for walking and carrying his serving tray "like a woman."9 5
They referred to him as "she" and "her," and called him a "faggot" and a
"female whore."9 6 These offensive taunts occurred at least once a week and
often several times within the same day.97 In addition to offensive comments,
Sanchez was chastised for not having sexual intercourse with a female co-
worker who was a friend.98 This behavior was clearly against company policy.
Sanchez complained to both his general manager and an assistant manager.99
When his complaints produced no results, he went to the human resources
director who eventually followed up with four or five "spot checks" to assess
the situation." ° During these visits, the director spoke only once to Sanchez
and made no attempt to investigate his complaints or discuss the situation with
the offending employees.'' Sanchez eventually filed a complaint with the
EEOC alleging sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.' 0 2 The district
court dismissed his complaint, finding that Sanchez's work environment was
neither objectively nor subjectively hostile and the conduct had not occurred
because of Sanchez's sex.' 03
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.' ° The court pointed to Sanchez's uncontra-
dicted testimony regarding the frequency of insults and the severity of his work
environment.' 0 5 It was not for the lower court to determine whether these
actions were severe or pervasive, but to determine whether the environment
was both objectively and subjectively hostile. 106 The record illustrated that
Sanchez sustained ongoing harassment, in the form of sexually derogatory
names and insults, and references to him using the female gender.' 07 This evi-
dence was sufficient to suggest that "a reasonable man would have found the
sustained campaign of taunts, directed at Sanchez and designed to humiliate
and anger him, sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and condi-
tions of his employment."'0 8 The fact that Sanchez complained to his superiors
93 Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001).
94 Id. at 872.
95 Id. at 870.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 874.
99 Id. at 870.
100 Id. at 871.
101 Id. at 876.
102 Id. at 871.
1o3 Id. at 872.
104 Id.
1o5 Id.
106 id.
107 Id.
o8 Id. at 873.
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also showed that the conduct was unwelcome, creating a subjectively hostile
work environment.'0 9 Sanchez's complaint was sufficient for the court to infer
his subjective belief that he was being harassed." 0
Furthermore, Sanchez alleged that the abuse was motivated by the harass-
ers' perception that he was effeminate; therefore, he was harassed because of
his sex."' The court found that the vulgar name-calling that Sanchez endured,
which was cast in female terms, was closely linked to gender.' 12 The continual
abuse directed at him reflected a belief that Sanchez did not act as his co-
workers perceived a man should act.' 1 3 The court focused on comments that
Sanchez carried his tray like a woman, that he-was referred to as "she" and
"her," and that he was teased for not having sex with his female friend." 4 The
court found that the rule set out in Price Waterhouse, designed to bar sexual
stereotype discrimination, applied to Sanchez's case. Therefore, the trial
court's finding of no hostile work environment was clearly erroneous. 115 Not
once did the court refer to the sexual orientation of the victim, nor did Sanchez
ever claim that he was singled out because his harassers perceived him to be
gay.
B. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.: Discrimination "Because of Sexual
Orientation"
Medina Rene is an openly gay man who worked as a butler for high-
rollers and wealthy guests of the MGM Grand Hotel." 16 During a two-year
period, Rene alleged that he was subjected to a hostile work environment cre-
ated by his co-workers, an all male staff, which occurred on nearly a daily
basis.' 17 Like Sanchez, Rene's male co-workers called him names associated
with women, 1 18 such as "sweetheart" and "doll;" they also whistled and blew
kisses at him." 9 But their harassment did not stop with mere name-calling.
The butlers also told crude jokes and gave Rene gag "gifts" that were sexual in
nature. 120 In addition, these co-workers forced Rene to look at pictures of
naked men having sex while they taunted and laughed at him.' 2 1 On numerous
occasions the harassment consisted of physical conduct of a sexual nature.' 22
Rene testified that the other men would "touch [his] body like they would to a
109 Id.
110 Id.
' Id. at 874.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
11" Id. at 875.
116 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc
decision).
117 Id.
118 Id.
"19 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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woman." '123 They would caress and hug him, grab his crotch, and poke their
fingers in his anus through his clothing.124
Complaints to supervisors were unavailing. Rene eventually filed a com-
plaint in district court alleging he was discriminated against because of his sex
and that being male was a factor in the unwelcome treatment. 125 Though Rene
initially declared that the harassment was directed toward him "because of
sex," he later admitted he believed he was being targeted because he is gay. 1
26
As a result, the district court dismissed his claim, finding that "Title VII's pro-
hibition of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of
gender and is not extended to, include, discrimination based on sexual
preference." 12
7
A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Rene's
claim for failure to show that the discrimination he endured was "because of
sex."' 12 8 The panel's reasoning was influenced by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Oncale, from which three examples of same-sex discrimination were
offered. 129 First, a plaintiff can show that the harasser was motivated by sexual
desire for his victim. 130 To do so, the plaintiff must present credible evidence
that his harasser is homosexual. 13' Rene failed in this regard when he admitted
he was being harassed because of his sexual orientation, and not because of the
sexual orientation of his harasser. 3 2 Second, a plaintiff may show that the
harasser was "motivated by general hostility to the presence of [men] in the
workplace."' 133 Rene again failed, since the workplace was entirely made up of
males and he was the only one who received such treatment.134 Third, a plain-
tiff may present comparative evidence to show how members of both sexes are
treated in a mixed-sex workplace. 135 Because Rene worked among only males,
this option was not available to him.136
Another important factor in the dismissal was Rene's deposition testi-
mony. 137 On nine separate instances during this deposition, Rene stated that
his co-workers specifically harassed him because he was gay. 138 The trial court
indicated that Rene never claimed that the harassment was based on his gender,
but only upon his sexual orientation. 13 Unfortunately, this fact proved fatal to
Rene's case. Because Title VII protects victims of harassment based on gen-
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001) (panel opinion
quoting lower court).
128 Id. at 1210.
129 Id. at 1208.
130 Id. at 1208-09.
131 Id. at 1209.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1210.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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der, but not sexual orientation, the court determined that Rene's claim must
fail. 140 The court stressed that Title VII protects only the express categories
included, "sex" being interchangeable with "gender," and that discrimination
based on other characteristics, "no matter how unfortunate and distasteful that
discrimination may be," is not protected by the statute.'
4 1
Like other circuit courts forced to dismiss claims by homosexual victims
who suffered horrendous harassing conduct, the Ninth Circuit panel did not do
so comfortably. The court made clear that it found the conduct "appalling" and
extremely disturbing. 142 In addition, the panel majority quoted the "eloquent
words" of the First Circuit:
We hold no brief for harassment because of sexual orientation; it is a noxious prac-
tice, deserving of censure and opprobrium. But we are called upon here to construe a
statute as glossed by the Supreme Court, not to make a moral judgment - and we
regard it as settled law that, as drafted and authoritatively construed, Title VII does
not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation.
14 3
In her dissent, Judge Nelson framed the issue as "whether countless sexual
assaults of an openly gay employee by male co-workers over the course of
more than two years of employment can constitute discrimination on the basis
of sex."' 144 Unlike the majority, she found that it did. 14 5 Judge Nelson claimed
that Rene's case was similar to the facts of Oncale, in that Rene was subjected
to several incidents of offensive touching of a sexual nature. 4 6 The only dif-
ference between the cases was that Rene testified he was openly gay and
believed that his abuse was based on his sexual orientation. 147 Regardless of
Rene's sexual orientation, the effect of this harassment was to humiliate him as
a man. 148 Though offensive comments directed at homosexuals are not action-
able under Title VII, "a line is crossed when the abuse is physical or sexual."'
14 9
In addition, Judge Nelson noted, the Oncale Court recognized that the three
examples presented did not constitute an exhaustive list of actionable Title VII
claims for same-sex harassment. 150 In effect, the majority opinion served to
make the egregious conduct suffered by Rene "immune from legal
recourse." 1
51
The Ninth Circuit had a chance to revisit the issue just seven months later
when it agreed to rehear Rene's argument en banc.'5 2 Surprisingly, the 8-4
opinion began with the bold assertion that an "employee's sexual orientation is
irrelevant for purposes of Title VII. It neither provides nor precludes a cause of
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1209.
142 Id.
143 Id. (quoting Higgins v. New Balance Shoes, 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)).
14 Id. at 1211 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1212.
149 Id. at 1211.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1212.
152 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc decision).
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action for sexual harassment."1 53 However, the reasoning behind this new
stance focused on whether the harassers engaged in severe or pervasive unwel-
come "physical conduct of a sexual nature," a phrase the court took directly
from Meritor Savings Bank. 154 If so, the plaintiff has a cognizable claim.
55
Based on this theory, the actions taken by Rene's harassers - poking him in the
anus, grabbing his crotch, and caressing him - were inescapably "because of
sex,"' 15 6 and were sufficiently severe and pervasive to create an objectively
offensive work environment.
157
Strangely enough, this time the court read Oncale in a new light, making
note of two important "lessons" derived from the opinion.' 58 The first lesson is
that Title VII prohibits "severe or pervasive same-sex offensive sexual touch-
ing."' 159 Consequently, sexual harassment claims under Title VII may not be
defeated by a mere showing that both parties were of the same gender.'16 Sec-
ond, a cause of action exists for "offensive sexual touching" even if all employ-
ees in the workplace are of the same gender.' 6' Here, the court read Oncale to
say that discrimination because of sex "can occur entirely among men, where
some men are subjected to offensive sexual touching and some men are not."'' 62
Judge Pregerson concurred in the opinion, but argued that Rene presented
a case of actionable gender stereotyping.163 He pointed out that Rene testified
that his harassers touched his body "like they would to a woman," a phrase that
links the harassment to his gender and presented evidence of gender stereotyp-
ing.1 " In many ways, the facts of Rene's case were indistinguishable from
those presented in Nichols, where the court found actionable gender stereotyp-
ing harassment.' 65 According to Judge Pregerson, what should be at issue is
"not what Rene perceived himself to be, but what his co-workers perceived him
to be, and how they acted on that perception."' 16
6
Judge Hug, in a dissent joined by three other Judges, declared:
"[d]iscrimination in the form of harassment or assault on the job because of a
man's activity outside the workplace, such as his sexual activities, is not a basis
for discrimination based on gender stereotyping of how he is expected to work
on the job."1 67 The dissent also argued that Rene did not assert a claim of
gender stereotyping, and thus should not be allowed to bring such claim on
appeal.' 68 The alleged harassment in Rene's case was not because of his sex,
15' Id. at 1063.
I" Id. at 1065; Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
151 Rene, 305 F.3d at 1065 (en banc decision).
156 Id. at 1066.
157 Id. at 1065.
158 Id. at 1067.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1068 (Pregerson, Graber & Fisher, JJ., concurring).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1068-69.
166 Id. at 1069 n.2.
167 Id. at 1072 (Hug, Schroeder, Fernandez & Nelson, JJ., dissenting),
168 Id. at 1070-71.
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but because of his homosexuality. 169 Since Rene's complaint solely alleged
harassment based on his sexual orientation, which is not cognizable under Title
VII, Judge Hug found that summary judgment was properly granted.'7 °
C. Understanding the Effects of Nichols and Rene: What Is the Solution?
Even though Rene ultimately prevailed on his Title VII claim, there are
several oddities about the two Rene decisions. In the first opinion, the panel
focused on Rene's deposition testimony, in which Rene admitted nine separate
times that he believed his harassers targeted him because he is gay. The panel
also read Oncale narrowly, limiting itself to the three examples offered in the
opinion. In the panel decision, there was no reference to the portion of Oncale
indicating that the list was not exhaustive. The Oncale Court clearly stated that
"[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow" in pursuing a sex-
ual harassment claim, he or she must show that the offensive conduct was "dis-
crimination . . . because of . . . sex." 17 ' This language allows a plaintiff to
choose any method he deems proper to prove his case; a plaintiff is not limited
to the examples set out by the Court.
The panel focused only on the three illustrative examples in Oncale,
ignoring the physical sexual abuse that Rene endured. In doing so, it swiftly
dismissed Rene's claim because, as a victim of discrimination based on his
sexual preference, the court found that Title VII afforded him no protection.
But, as Judge Nelson was quick to point out in her dissent, "a line is crossed"
when harassment turns to physical sexual assaults. 7 2 Such harassment in the
workplace has been actionable since the Supreme Court's holding in Meritor,
regardless of the gender or sexual preferences of the victim or aggressor. The
panel's discomfort with Rene's case led it to completely overlook this point and
instead lament the injustices endured by Rene as a victim of such appalling and
disturbing conduct.17 3
To confuse the matter further, the subsequent en banc court gleaned les-
sons from Oncale that the Supreme Court may never have meant to instruct.
To the en banc court, Oncale stands for the proposition that "Title VII forbids
severe or pervasive same-sex sexual touching," and that discrimination because
of sex "can occur entirely among men, where some men are subjected to offen-
sive touching and some men are not."' 7 4 This is wishful thinking on the court's
part, because nowhere in the opinion does the Oncale Court proclaim that
same-sex offensive touching is prohibited under Title VII. To be sure, Oncale
suffered physical assaults of a sexual nature, as did Rene, but the Supreme
Court did not claim that this conduct was actionable. It found only that Title
VII protects both men and women, reasoning that nothing in the language of
the statute says relief is precluded for a victim harassed by someone of the
169 Id. at 1074.
170 Id. at 1078.
171 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
172 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2001) (panel opinion)
(Nelson, J., dissenting).
113 Rene, 243 F.3d at 1209 (panel opinion).
114 Rene, 305 F.3d at 1067 (en banc decision).
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same sex. Whether or not Oncale had a cause of action based on the facts of
his case was a matter for the lower court to decide on remand.
Moreover, it is unclear how the same court could dismiss Rene's case after
he admitted that his harassers targeted him because he is gay, and then subse-
quently make the bold assertion that sexual orientation is irrelevant to a Title
VII claim. The reasoning of the en banc Ninth Circuit court is also unclear
because the sentence following this bold assertion imposes a further element
onto a claim of sexual harassment - that there must be some evidence of "phys-
ical conduct of a sexual nature." 17 5 This is at odds with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Nichols, where Sanchez was the target of derogatory insults based
on his effeminacy, but was never physically abused in a sexual way. Yet, in
Nichols the Ninth Circuit found the harassment was actionable because of sex.
It did so knowing that the harassers called Sanchez a "faggot," an assertion
clearly indicating that his co-workers perceived him to be gay.176 These facts
are strikingly similar to Rene, with the exception that Rene was openly gay and
Sanchez was not. The Ninth Circuit appears to contradict itself by saying that
sexual orientation is irrelevant, yet if you happen to be openly gay, you have no
cause of action unless you have been physically assaulted in a sexual manner
by your harassers.
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit could have easily avoided the issue of
sexual orientation in Rene altogether, and simply followed the precedent set out
in Meritor prohibiting harassment involving physical conduct of a sexual
nature. As the Meritor court held, the essential component of a sexual harass-
ment complaint is that the advances were "unwelcome," and it does not matter
if the victim's participation in the acts appears "voluntary.' 77 The effect of
the court's original panel decision is to hang Rene's future on how he catego-
rized his harassment, and not on the actions of the harassers. The absurdity of
this result is further evidenced by the court's willingness to revisit the issue,
focusing on the physical abuse of a sexual nature. The fact that the panel court
ignored traditional notions of sexual harassment laid out in Meritor shows the
difficulty that arises when trying to distinguish sexual stereotyping from sexual
orientation discrimination. The panel decision follows in the footsteps of other
lower court opinions, treating same-sex harassment claims based on stereotyp-
ing as impermissible sexual orientation claims. These opinions appear to revert
back to traditional notions of construing "sex" in the biological sense.
Though the en banc court finally found an avenue of relief for Rene under
the theory of unwelcome physical conduct of a sexual nature, this decision does
not end the uncertainty of how to treat same-sex discrimination claims. The
Supreme Court continually espouses that the intent of Congress in creating
Title VII was to "strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes,"1 78 yet courts are still unwilling to
include gender stereotyping based on perceptions of sexual preference within
this "entire spectrum." As Judge Pregerson declared in his concurrence, the
175 Id. at 1064.
176 Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d at 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001).
177 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
178 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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focus should be on what plaintiffs co-workers perceive him to be. 179 This is
what motivates the behavior behind their actions, whether or not they actually
know if their victim is gay.
To end confusion over who is, and who is not, entitled to protection under
the theory of sexual stereotyping, the court should recognize sexual orientation
discrimination as a category of gender stereotyping. Sexual orientation dis-
crimination arises when homosexuals are discriminated against for not con-
forming to the masculine stereotype of being sexually attracted to members of
the opposite sex. By recognizing this as a type of gender stereotyping, plain-
tiffs like Sanchez and Rene, who suffer from virtually identical humiliating and
degrading treatment, would have equal remedies. For example, the court in
Nichols, in determining Sanchez's harassment to be "because of sex," noted
that Sanchez had been taunted with gender-specific derogatory terms designed
to humiliate him as a man, and that he had been chided for not having sexual
relations with his female friend. The court did not address Sanchez's sexual
orientation when it decided that the effect was to "humiliate him as a man."
Yet, it was because of his failure to conform to a masculine stereotype, and his
perceived lack of attraction for the opposite sex, that drove his harassers. The
same is true in Rene's case. The only difference is that the perception of the
harassers was validated by Rene's openness regarding his sexual orientation.
The motivation behind the conduct was the same in both cases, whether or not
the victim had officially "come out" with his sexual preference.
Until courts recognize sexual orientation discrimination as a subset of sex
stereotyping, we will have to continue to wade through confusing and contra-
dictory opinions. It is too difficult to draw the line between the two forms of
discrimination, and doing so necessarily imposes a moral judgment on victims
who are openly gay. Without allowing equal justice for both types of victims,
and affording a remedy only for the "closet homosexual," courts will continue
to dismiss claims of impermissible gender stereotyping, in apparent contradic-
tion with precedent and congressional intent.
V. SEXUAL ORIENTATION LEGISLATION: THE TREND TOWARD RECOGNITION
The strongest argument against acknowledging sexual orientation discrim-
ination as a form of sex stereotyping is that it appears to be contrary to legisla-
tive intent. Those opposed to protecting victims of sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII are quick to point out that proposals to add sex-
ual orientation to the list of protected classes have repeatedly failed.18 ° They
also argue that it is not the court's place to make laws or recognize causes of
action that are contrary to congressional intent. Yet, the Supreme Court has
already recognized sexual harassment, sexual stereotyping, and same-sex dis-
crimination even though the statute does not explicitly provide for such causes
of action and there is little or no legislative history indicating that Congress
179 Rene, 305 F.3d at 1069 n.2 (en banc decision) (Pregerson, Graber & Fisher, JJ.,
concurring).
180 Sunanda K. Ray-Holmes, Discrimination Based on One's Sexual Preference: Should
Strict Scrutiny Apply?, 34 How. L.J. 341, 342 n.12 (1991) (listing several amendment pro-
posals that were rejected).
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intended this type of protection. In fact, Meritor has been followed as prece-
dent for sexual harassment claims for nearly seventeen years despite the fact
that Congress has never expressly added a sexual harassment claim to Title VII.
It is very unlikely that Congressman Smith, who proposed that "sex" be
added as a protected category in an attempt to defeat the Civil Rights Act,
would ever have imagined or intended that "because of sex" would be read to
include the broad range of claims that it now covers. Furthermore, in Oncale,
the Supreme Court asserted: "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the princi-
pal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed." '1 81 One can certainly argue that it is reasonable for the Supreme
Court to extend the same discretion to sexual orientation discrimination as it
utilized in recognizing sex stereotyping and same-sex harassment as cognizable
Title VII claims.
Moreover, to say that proposals to add sexual orientation to Title VII have
repeatedly failed is to tell only half of the story. Finding protection for victims
of sexual orientation discrimination is a cause that refuses to die in the political
arena. In fact, it continues to grow and draw strength. When Representative
Koch first proposed an amendment to the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimi-
nation based on "affectional or sexual preference" in public accommodation,
housing and employment opportunities in 1977, he was backed by only ten co-
sponsors. 182 When re-introduced into the House of Representatives only two
years later, the bill was backed by fifty-six co-sponsors. 18 3 More recently,
Representative Gerry Studds introduced the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act of 1994 to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation; this bill was backed by 137 co-sponsors.18 4 That number grew to 160
by 1997.185 In addition, a push to add a sexual orientation amendment to Title
VII in 1996 was only narrowly defeated in the Senate by a 50-49 margin.
18 6
Thus, the drive to protect victims who have been discriminated against based
on sexual preference is gaining force. This trend shows it is only a matter of
time before victims like Rene will have justice for the unthinkable conduct they
have endured.
VI. CONCLUSION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is designed to protect victims from arbi-
trary discrimination in employment. Title VII was enacted to provide relief to
victims for a broad array of violations. The Supreme Court determined that
Congress intended to protect victims of harassment as well as other forms of
discrimination. With regard to harassment "because of sex," the Court has
181 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
182 Civil Rights Amendments, H.R. 451, 95th Cong. (1977).
183 Civil Rights Amendment of 1979, H.R. 2074, 96th Cong. (1979).
184 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994).
185 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997).
186 Theodore A. Schroeder, Fables of the Deconstruction: The Practical Failures of Gay
and Lesbian Theory in the Realm of Employment Discrimination, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 333, 366 (1998).
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extended this theory to victims of sexual stereotyping and same-sex harass-
ment. It determined that when an employer discriminates on the belief that an
individual must act in accordance with traditional gender stereotypes, the
employer has violated Title VII.
Though the Supreme Court has made it clear that this protection covers
both men and women, even when the victim and harasser are of the same gen-
der, many lower courts have continued to reject claims of same-sex harassment
as being impermissible claims of sexual orientation discrimination, a category
not expressly covered by Title VII. Until the Court recognizes that sexual ori-
entation discrimination is merely a subset of sexual stereotyping, lower courts
will either stretch to find relief for deserving victims of same-sex harassment,
or struggle with distinguishing the two types of claims based on confusing and
contradictory precedent.
